Publicação
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form
| Resumo: | This paper suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players. |
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| Autores principais: | Martins, Ana Paula |
| Assunto: | Two-person cooperative games Cooperative games maximands Opportunism Pessimism |
| Ano: | 2021 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
| Resumo: | This paper suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players. |
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